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The Death of Contract collects Professor Gilmore's lectures given
at Ohio State University Law School in 1970, with footnotes added
to provide further explanation, qualification, and documentation.
It is easy to tell that these were lectures, not because of their tone
of urbane chattiness (Gilmore's gift of style makes some of his
most technical work sound like Talleyrand's table talk), but because
of the looseness of their design and casualness of their execution.
The speaker frequently drops the thread of his narrative to break
into anecdote or digression and, when he again picks up the narra-
tive, it is not always by the same thread. But for all their infor-
mality these lectures are of extraordinary interest. They tell us
how a great commercial lawyer (who is also a legal historian and
contracts casebook editor1 ) views what happened to the law of
contract in the 20th century. Though expounded with rare fe-
licity and supported by an unusual breadth of historical learning,
this perspective is, I believe, a common one among scholars of con-
tract law. I shall be arguing here that it is also a fundamentally
distorted one-not so much erroneous as myopic. But first, a sum-
mary of the book.
I.
The "Contract" whose demise this book describes is the system-
atic theory of contract law pieced together by academic lawyers in
America in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Before 1871
contract law was a loose confederation of subspecialties such as ne-
gotiable instruments and sales that was not yet a "systematically
organized, sharply differentiated, body of law."'2 Dean Langdell,
"an industrious researcher of no distinction whatever either of
mind or . . . of style,"3 proposed the idea of a general theory of
contract in his casebook 4 and "Summary"; 5 Holmes sketched the
* Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University. A.B., 1931, Ph.D. 1936,
LL.B. 1942, Yale University.
1. See F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d
ed. 1970).
2. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
GILMORE].
3. Id. at 13.
4. See C. LANGDELL, CASES ON CONTRACTS (1st ed. 1871).
5. See C. LANGDELL, Summary of the Law of Contracts, in CASES ON
CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1880).
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outline of the theory;8 and Williston's treatise7 filled in the theory
with "meticulous, although not always accurate, scholarly detail."
Says Gilmore:
The [Holmes-Williston] theory seems to have been dedi-
cated to the proposition that, ideally, no one should be li-
able to anyone for anything. Since the ideal was not at-
tainable, the compromise solution was to restrict liability
within the narrowest possible limits. Within those limits,
however, liability was to be absolute .... Liability, al-
though absolute-at least in theory-was nevertheless to
be severely limited.9
One "tool for narrowing the range of contractual liability" was
Holmes' "bargain theory" of consideration, from which Williston
went on to deduce such absurdly impractical consequences as the
revocability of firm offers before acceptance and the unenforceabil-
ity both of modifications of going contracts (unless supported by
further "consideration") and creditors' agreements to release debt-
ors for less than the full amount due.10 Holmes' famous repudia-
tion of the'notion that contracts result from the subjective meeting
of the parties' minds and his insistence upon restricting legal in-
quiry to the external sayings and doings of the parties made it
hard to prove excusing circumstances such as mistake, thus tending
to make liability, once assumed, absolute." To narrow the extent
of such liability, Hadley v. Baxendale 2, which had already lim-
ited recovery for consequential damages to those defendant could
have foreseen at the time of contracting, was read to deny recovery
even for forseeable losses unless defendant had assumed the risk of
their occurrence.
1 3
But "[a] lmost from the very moment of its birth," the Holmes-
Williston theory started to break down, and Gilmore is 'tempted"
to call Corbin and Cardozo its destroyers.' 4 Courts persisted in de-
ciding cases in ways that did not fit the theory; Cardozo in particu-
lar nearly always managed to squeee enough "consideration" out of
the facts to support a relied upon promise. At Corbin's insistence,
the authors of the Restatement of Contracts took account of these
wayward cases, and thus produced a document shot through with
6. O.W. HOLMES, TiE COMMON LAw Lectures VUI-IX (M. Howe ed.
1963).
7. S. WILLIsToN, THE LAW OF CONRACTS (lst ed. 1920-22).
8. GILMORE 14.
9. Id. (Citations omitted.) It is not clear whether Gilmore is saying
that these effects upon liability were aimed at by the theory or were inci-
dental consequences of it.
10. Id. at 21-22.
11. Id. at 41-42.
12. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
13. GILMORE 49-53.
14. Id. at 57.
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self-contradictions. 15 Since the first Restatement, statutes and ex-
ceptions have whittled away the rest of the old structure. There has
been an "explosion" of both scope and extent of liability and
also of excuses from it.16 In fact, Gilmore speculates, contract is
well on its way-on the backs of unjust enrichment and reliance
doctrine-to being merged with tort into a "unified theory of civil
obligation."'
1 7
That is basically Gilmore's story. As one would expect, he tells
it well. He is perhaps at his best demonstrating how Holmes and
Williston ruthlessly chopped and stretched the English case law to
fit their system-there is an eight-page' 8 analysis of the appar-
ently immortal Peerless case' that no one who still teaches it can
afford to pass up. But when the magic of the speaker's voice has
faded, one begins to realize that this has been a very curious per-
formance.
II.
To begin with, in what sense is Contract-that is, the academic
"classical" system of Holmes and Williston-really dead? To be
sure, no one now subscribes to it whole, as a system. Yet its cate-
gories (unilateral v. bilateral offers, promises v. conditions, etc.)
are still used to organize casebooks and hornbooks; its principal
cases and those of our contract teachers are the same; and the prob-
lems it tried to solve (offer and acceptance crossing in the mails,
mistake as an excuse, etc.) are still the standard diet of the first
year law student. Williston on Contracts is in its third edition.
Contract, in the academy, seems to be alive and well. Indeed, there
is a school of thought that holds that the academy is the only place
where it survives. Gilmore addresses himself directly to the mem-
bers of this school in his introduction:
We are told that Contract, like God, is dead. And so
it is. Indeed the point is hardly worth arguing anymore.
The leaders of the Contract is Dead movement go on to say
that Contract, being dead, is no longer a fit or worthwhile
subject of study. Law students should be dispensed from
the accomplishment of antiquarian exercises in and about
the theory of consideration. Legal scholars should, the
fact of death having been recorded, turn their attention
elsewhere. They should, it is said, observe the current
scene and write down a description of what they see. They
should engage in sociological analysis rather than in his-
15. Id. at 60-64. Gilmore illustrates the "schizophrenia" of the Restate-
ment through § 75 (restating Holmes' bargain theory of consideration) and
§ 90 (providing for recovery for unbargained-for reliance on a promise).
16. Id. at 65-83.
17. Id. at 90.
18. Id. at 35-42.
19. Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 Hurl. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
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torical or philosophical synthesis. It is at this point that
I find myself not so much in disagreement with their aims
as completely uninterested in what they are doing.
Describing what you see is undoubtedly a useful ex-
ercise .... However, when you have finished describing
something, all you really have is a list. In itself the list
is meaningless . . . The list takes on meaning only as it is
related to other lists .... The most lovingly detailed
knowledge of the present state of things . . . begins to be-
come useful to us only when we are in a position to com-
pare it with what we know about what was going on last
year and the year before that and so on back through the
floating mists of time .... We are not scientists-not
even social scientists-nor were meant to be. Let us
not be overly depressed at that not altogether depressing
thought.
20
The tone is that of a Headmaster of Eton who has heard of a
proposal to abolish compulsory Greek. But the substance is even
more remarkable. The "leaders of the Contract is Dead movement",
it is made clear in a footnote, 21 are Professors Stewart Macaulay
and Lawrence Friedman.2 2 Gilmore's response to their views is not
by way of traverse but confession and avoidance: he agrees with
them that "Contract is Dead" but is "uninterested" in what they are
doing. They are pictured as committed to a mindless Baconian
empiricism, and their approach is condemned as ahistorical.
But this really won't do. Friedman and Macaulay would mean
something quite different from Gilmore by an assertion that Con-
tract is dead-not the demise merely of a theory of contract law,
but the waning of the contract decisions of courts as a significant
factor in American commercial life. Far from being mindless fact-
gathering, their empiricism has been devoted in part to substanti-
ating this assertion. And the assertion has a historical dimension:
Professor Friedman's thesis of the "decline of the court" in regulat-
ing commercial disputes in the 20th century and of the displace-
ment of the case law of contract by statute, administrative regula-
tion, and private bureaucracy. 23 Gilmore says Friedman and Ma-
20. GILMORE 3-4.
21. Id. at 105 n.1. Gilmore refers his readers to a 1967 symposium on
contract law in this review as containing " [oilne of the most comprehensive
statements of the approach which I am tendentiously and no doubt unfairly
characterizing. . . ." and in particular to the lead article in that symposium,
Friedman & Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Teaching: Past, Present
and Future, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 805.
22. Respectively, Professors of Law at the University of Wisconsin and
Stanford Law Schools.
23. L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 184-215 (1965). The thesis
is discussed in detail at text accompanying notes 54-56 infra. Gilmore
praises this book, GILMORE 105 n.1 and even quotes extensively from it,
Id. 6-7, but oddly neither refers to nor uses those passages of the book that
specifically treat the period of his concern.
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caulay's approach is uninteresting; they say his is unimportant.
What we have here are not varying temperamental preferences but
fundamental differences in perspective.
Gilmore's perspective on the history of contract is probably that
of the dominant mode of thought in our law schools, which might
be called Case-Law Realism. Friedman and Macaulay's is a dis-
tinctly minority approach that I shall call Behavioral Realism.24
The content of both is heavily influenced by the work of the Legal
Realists of the interwar period.
Case-Law Realism is a compromise religion. It is as if out of the
academic quarrels of the 1920's and 30's a treaty resulted by the
terms of which Langdellians agreed to give up trying to construct
logically consistent systems of doctrine in return for the retention
of appellate cases as the intellectual focus of law study; and the
Realists replied that, though they stressed function over logic as
the thing to look for in a legal rule, they would look for it in the
rules of appellate courts and therefore, though they regarded the
24. Though I could not come up with a better label, I acknowledge that
this one is somewhat defective. Its scope is roughly co-extensive with what
is called the "problem" approach to contract law in Friedman & Macaulay,
supra note 21, at 806: "The goal of research [via this approach] was to ana-
lyze case law in order to lay bare the various situations or problems re-
flected and to solve them by explicit use of principles of policy." That is,
the goal of legal scholarship is to develop sound doctrine to apply to trans-
actions of the kinds engaged in by litigants in appellate cases. It seemed
to me that the word "Realism" adequately conveyed this school's concern
with policy issues. I wanted a label that also stressed the centrality of case
law study in this approach. The label is misleading in some respects. As
Friedman and Macaulay point out members of this school do not shun stat-
utes as Langdell did. Id. at 808. They should really be called Case-Law-
and-Code Realists. They drafted the Uniform Commercial Code (Professor
Gilmore among them) and accord its provisions the same status as case law
in their law review analyses. "Realism" must also be taken broadly as
shorthand representing characteristics such as (a) awareness that law
serves certain social purposes, (b) concern to make it serve those purposes
better, (c) skepticism about the utility of rules expressed in conceptual
form, and (d) preference for explicit articulation by the courts of rules in
terms of their relationship to the social purposes they are framed to serve.
This sense of "Realism" would be broad enough to include, for example,
Professor Lon Fuller, who would normally be classified as a jurisprudential
opponent of "Legal Realism" if it were narrowly conceived as a specific
historical movement.
Professor Ian MacNeil's label for the present orthodoxy is "neo-tradi-
tional," which is accurate enough but not very expressive. MacNeil classi-
fies both traditional and neo-traditional approaches to contract law as
"transactionism," which he criticizes for assuming that "a contract is a dis-
crete transaction . . . an event sensibly viewable separately from events
preceding and following it . . . [and] one engaging only small segments of
the total personal beings of the participants." He argue5 that contracts in
our society and economy are increasingly "relational" (e.g. automobile fran-
chises, leases of IBM machines)-ongoing engagements involving "many as-
pects of the total personal beings of the participants." MacNeil, The Many
Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 693-94, 805 n.320 (1974).
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study of law as the study of behavior, the behavior they would
concentrate on would be that of appellate judges in the act of de-
ciding cases. What sets apart the Case Lawyers from other de-
scendants of the Realists, then, is simply their choice of how to
draw the lines limiting the range of social phenomena of interest to
them. They draw them around cases. Case reports supply most of
their data. Rationalizing, explaining or criticizing the reasoning
and results of cases is their principal activity and their ultimate
purpose is the design of sound policy for the decision of cases.
This may be illustrated by pointing to some attitudes and activi-
ties characteristic of this school's work in contract law. "Killing
Contract", or demonstrating the inadequacy of the classical theory,
has been (as Gilmore's book shows) a central preoccupation of the
Case-Law Realists. The chief method of refutation has been find-
ing clusters of decided cases-"case law undergrounds," Gilmore
calls them25-reaching results plainly at odds with the theory.2 6
Another enterprise has been the discovery in the "case law under-
grounds" of regular patterns of decision-making. Some of the
best work in Contracts has been in this tradition. 27  In this kind
of research, involving empirical inquiry into what the courts in fact
do, decided cases are obviously the appropriate data. But in other
Realistic endeavors the case-law bias puts strange restraints on re-
search effort. The Realist's "abiding interest," as Gilmore remarks
of Corbin, is "in what he called the 'operative facts' of cases."' 28
The Realist method makes nearly all facts vaguely connected with
the parties or their business operative: the informal behavior of
contracting parties (course of dealing, course of performance, pa-
rol remarks outside the standard form), trade custom and usage,
and so forth.29 The article on sales in the Uniform Commercial
25. GILMORE 56.
26. See, e.g., Cook, Book Review, 33 ILL. L. REv. 497, 512-513 (1939)
(cases on life insurance contracts at variance with Williston's strictures as
to when acceptance becomes effective); and Fuller, Book Review, 18 N.C.L.
REV. 1, 3-4 (1939) (Williston's insistence that contract law cannot reimburse
for detrimental reliance ignores many cases in which courts have done so).
27. See, e.g., Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages
(pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936); Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contra-
hendo, Bargaining in Good Faith and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative
Study, 77 HARv. L. Rzv. 401 (1964). Professor Kessler, incidentally, is very
difficult to pin down with any classifying label, even to those employed in
this review and intended to describe only approaches to Contracts. This
article and his casebook set him among the Case Law Realists, his studies
of automobile dealer franchises and contracts of adhesion among Behavioral
Realists. He has also a comparative law breadth and a philosophical and
social-theoretical depth, unusual in academic lawyers of any school.
28. GILMORE 58.
29. See Friedman & Macaulay, supra note 21, at 806:
[The realists argued] Why ask whether a unilateral contract could
be revoked by the offeror prior to full performance? Better to know
who the parties were, the circumstances of the bargain, and any rele-
vant background or consequence. Was it a consumer sale? A bro-
kerage contract? A construction contract? Of what type?
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Code was drafted so as to generate a rich outpouring of facts
about the conduct and business background of the litigants for
courts in commercial cases to consider. 30  But in explaining or
criticizing cases, the Case Lawyers rarely look outside the cases
themselves for operative facts, even though the statement of facts in
their cases may have been constructed by counsel and a court in-
terested only in the much smaller universe of facts necessary to
operate Willistonian doctrine. Case Lawyers will gratefully make
use of the studies others make of trade practices, and even on occa-
sion advocate conducting such studies, but only to find out facts
helpful in deciding cases.3'
The basic policy ambition of the Case Lawyers, then, seems to be
education of the judge. Their articles, case-notes and treatises in-
form and sharpen the mind of the court. But close attention to
the work of appellate courts does more than that:
It is the case method which provides the student with a
vicarious experience in the task of conceiving, explaining,
justifying, and applying the rules by which society is en-
abled to function successfully. Karl Llewellyn used to
talk about the "law job". This is a complex job, and those
who have not directly or indirectly participated in it are
badly equipped to discharge any social role affected by it.
8 2
In other words, understanding the process of deciding appeals is
the key to understanding the role of law and lawyers in society.
The process is not the only legal process, but it is the master pro-
cess whose study reveals the rest, as the miscroscopic study of a
beetle was believed in the 18th century to unlock the pattern of
the mind of God. And the process secretes not only the basic legal
tasks but the basic legal norms "by. which society is enabled to
function successfully." "If our objective," Professor Fuller has
written, "is to achieve an economic order based on free exchange,
that order will, as it develops, tend to reveal in litigated cases the
principles necessary to sustain it."
' 3
3
The main difference between Case Law and Behavioral Realists 4
30. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-102(2) (b), 1-205, 2-202, 2-
208, 2-302(2), and innumerable other sections.
31. One of the articles in the Wisconsin Symposium that Gilmore refers
to, GILMORE 105 n.1, exemplifies this approach:
If one reason for nonuse of courts by businessmen is unrealistic rules
and standards for decision, would not a concerted effort to improve
that phase of contract law in courts change the entire perspective?
... [O]ne question should be this: How can law and social science
together assist courts in making more rational decisions in the adjudi-
cation of contract disputes?
Speidel, Contract Law: Some Reflections upon Commercial Context and
the Judicial Process, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 822, 826.
32. L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW xiii (3d ed. 1972).
33. L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF T=E LAW 109 (1968).
34. Friedman and Macaulay themselves describe their approach as "be-
havioral". Friedman & Macaulay, supra note 21, at 808.
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is not their empiricism, as Gilmore (and in some moods the Beha-
viorists themselves) would have it, for the ordinary Case Lawyer's
job of looking for regular patterns of rule-application is also empiri-
cal research. Nor is it that Behaviorism is necessarily more sys-
tematic-to find out what people thought about legal liability for
charges on lost credit cards, for instance, Macaulay once stood at
gas pumps asking motorists questions as their tanks were filled.35
The difference is simply that Behaviorists refuse to limit their uni-
verse of investigation to cases. Llewellyn's description of the en-
terprise of over 40 years ago still fits:
[T] he focus of study... should now be consciously shifted
to the area of contact, of interaction, between official regu-
latory behavior and the behavior of those affecting or af-
fected by official regulatory behavior; and that the rules
and precepts and principles which have hitherto tended
to keep the limelight should be displaced and treated with
severe reference to their bearing upon that area of contact
-in order that paper rules may be revealed for what they
are, and rules with real behavior correspondences come
into due importance.36
Case Lawyers follow this program to the extent that they are
willing to study one group of officials (judges) engaged in one sort
of behavior (making and applying rules in deciding appeals) in or-
der to find out which paper rules have certain limited kinds of be-
havior correspondences (i.e., which are actually employed as rules
of decision in cases). They are also interested in the impact of
these rules on contracting parties' out-of-court behavior, but be-
lieve this to be a subject more appropriate for guesswork than for
study. Behaviorists, on the other hand, ask not only what social
functions are performed by courts but also who else in society,
official agencies or private parties, performs those same func-
tions. Once the focus of study is thus shifted, they assert, the work
of courts is seen to shrink to near insignificance.
35. Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run
by IBM Machine, The Law of Contracts, and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV.
1051, 1099 (1966). This is not meant as criticism. Indeed I fear sometimes
that legal Behaviorists will prove overly susceptible to the attractions of
the technology of fact-finding and will follow where many other social sci-
entists have gone-into narrowing the range of their study to data that suit
the rigors of the technique. But this has not happened, and the often quite
casual methods of this school have yielded rich harvests of insights.
36. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431, 464 (1930). But in the very next paragraph Llewellyn went on
perversely, though apologetically, to declare himself a crypto-Case Lawyer:
At the very heart, I suspect, is the behavior of judges, peculiarly, that
part of their behavior that marks them as judges-those practices
which establish the continuity of their office with their predecessors
and successors, and which make their official contacts with other per-
sons; but that suspicion on my part may be a relic of the case law
tradition in which we American lawyers have been raised.
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To illustrate their grounds for this assertion-which naturally
vastly irritates the Case Lawyers-we might start by cataloging
the social functions that the law of contract is generally thought
to perform. From the principal law review literature on the sub-
ject3 7 one could extract something like the following list, on most
of whose items both Case Law and Behavioral Realists could
probably agree. Contract law is both a system of rules and a
process for orderly settling of disputes. (a) As a system of rules
it provides a framework for market activity by assisting business-
men in planning their contractual relationships. Rules affecting
contract formation and modification, formal requirements such as
the Statute of Frauds, and rules of interpretation such as the Pa-
rol Evidence Rule inform businessmen in advance what they must
do to make their agreements enforceable and construed, if there is
trouble, as they would wish. This encourages them to deliberate
carefully over entering agreements, trains then to think about
possible contingencies, and encourages them in careful and unam-
biguous spelling out of their performance obligations. (b) The
system supports market activity by providing sanctions to deter
breach. (c) The rules also perform various regulatory functions,
such as promoting fair dealing in the market (through such de-
vices as requirements of conspicuousness or proscription of "un-
conscionable" sales practices) or serving ends extrinsic to the mar-
ket (such as protecting infant industry or redistributing wealth).
(d) As a dispute-settlement process contract law supports the mar-
ket by reconstructing the contractual intentions of the litigants and
awarding money to compensate for the disappointed hopes of
at least one of them; and simultaneously (and often inconsistently)
(e) tries to reach a settlement equitable not in the light of the par-
ties' expectations, but in view of their present situation by resolv-
ing ambiguities in favor of or by excusing weaker parties, avoid-
ing imposing crushing liabilities, etc.
Such preliminary research as the Behaviorists have done38 points
37. See J.W. HuRsT, LAW AND EcoNoMIc GROWTH 285-342 (1964); 2 R. v.
JHERING, GEIST DES R6MISCHEN RECEHTS 478-504 (9te. Aufl. 1968); MAx WEBER
ON LAW IN SOCIETY AND ECONOMY, 29-40 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954); Fried-
man, Law, Rules, and the Interpretation of Written Documents, 59 Nw. U.L.
REV. 751, 774-779 (1965); F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, supra note 1. at 1-14.
Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704
(1931); Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941);
Macaulay, supra note 35; Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law of Con-
tracts, 13 STAN. L. REV. 812 (1961).
38. See S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE AUToMoBILE
MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS (1966); Friedman & Macaulay, supra
note 21; Friedman, On Legalistic Reasoning-A Footnote to Weber, 1966
Wis. L. REV. 148; Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, 28 AM.
Soc. REv. 55 (1963). There is also a small but growing number of short
studies of specific business practices. To those who are familiar with this
literature, my reiteration of its findings in this paragraph can only be
tedious. But if someone like Grant Gilmore is capable of completely misun-
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towards the following conclusions. Many businessmen pay little
or no attention to the rules of contract law in planning their rela-
tionships. Some are accustomed to and prefer casual, informal
dealings. Some use standard forms without reading them or re-
lying on their terms for protection. Others use standard forms
which they both read and rely on, but the forms are drawn with a
view not to legal consequences but to bureaucratic convenience.
Still others carefully plan and structure their relationships on pa-
per but without regard for what might happen in litigation (e.g.,
some major manufacturer-supplier contracts are probably unen-
forceable in court; the parties know this but don't care). The sanc-
tions provided by contract would in most instances be too weak to
deter a really determined contract-breacher; but weak or strong,
the damage sanctions are usually irrelevant because in very few
situations does it make any sense to litigate. Where there is a mu-
tually productive continuing relationship, there is a strong incen-
tive to peaceful resolution of disputes; where expected mutual
benefit fails, fear of bad publicity or adverse credit ratings will
often succeed in settling arguments; even when a relationship
breaks down completely it is cheaper for aggrieved parties to quit
the relationship than to go to court; and where there is a resort to
more formal processes it is most likely to be to some form of arbi-
tration.
Moreover, the regulatory aspects of contract law have marginal
impact on most business relationships (except as rules for stand-
ard forms to draft around) because when significant interests con-
flict, regulation of them is almost never permitted to be handled
by common law but becomes the subject of specialized stautory
and administrative attention (e.g., labor law or insurance).
What then is left to the common law of contract? The com-
mon kinds of appellate cases are:
atypical or freak business transactions; economically mar-
ginal deals both in terms of the type of transaction and
amounts involved; high-stake, zero-sum speculations; deals
where there is an outsider interest that does not allow
compromise; and family economic transactions.89
If all this is true, or even partly true, the emphasis placed on
cases by contracts scholars and teachers does seem a bit misplaced.
This is especially so since some of the Behaviorists' conclusions
may be reached without even looking outside the cases. It has,
for example, been obvious to Case Lawyers for some time that the
conventional "contract and market" measure of expectation dam-
ages is not a sanction that packs much punch: 40 Holmes' famous
derstanding the Friedman-Macaulay thesis, it obviously could bear some
repetition.
39. Friedman & Macaulay, supra note 21 at 817.
40. [T] here has long been evident in the literature, both judicial and aca-
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"bad man"' 41 would take one look at our contract remedies, di-
luted by Hadley v. Baxendale limitations, the mitigation princi-
ple, and our system's failure to award the winner attorney's fees,
and laugh evilly. Does anyone suppose this situation could con-
ceivably have lasted for as long as it has if significant economic in-
terests had wished it otherwise? This alone should tell us that our
appellate cases will be curious ones. Moreover, as Gilmore's book
shows, classical contract law has deteriorated into a highly par-
ticularistic mode of judicial decision-making tailored to the unique
facts of individual disputes; it carries out chiefly the "dispute-set-
tlement" functions described above.42 There is surely no doctrine
more pliable than contract doctrine; consideration has been made
to serve so many purposes that there is no resilience left in it.
In this state of affairs, contract will not provide many rules of
general application sufficiently predictable for private parties to
use in planning relationships. Even if the parties do try to pro-
vide for litigation, they cannot know what would happen if they
litigate, what behavior of theirs the court would or would not
take into account, what policies of equity or fairness it would try
to serve, and whether it would understand their relationship well
enough to see what they wanted and what went wrong. Parties
who really do have occasion to litigate may attempt to draft clauses
"excluding or controlling the 'irrational factor' in litigation" in
their contracts, 43 as by merger, liquidated damages, or disclaimer
clauses rebuffing attempts at individualized, equitable adjudica-
tion. But this use of legal form for planning purposes is also the
least likely to survive serious challenge in appellate litigation, for
these clauses are the most likely to be struck or limited in the in-
terests of promoting fair dealing or protecting underdogs. 44 Thus
even investigation within the traditional confines of Case Law
seems to support, albeit on different grounds, the Friedman-Ma-
cauley thesis of the marginality of case law in the economic sys-
tem.
The Case Lawyers might respond to the Behavioralist criticism
demic, an uneasy feeling that there is something wrong with a dam-
ages rule [the "contract and market" rule], which, over a range of
factual situations, produces no damages and thus, so far as legal sanc-
tions go, allows contracts to be breached with impunity.
F. KESSLER, & G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 1042. The style points to Gil-
more as the author.
41. O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLEcTED LEGAL PAPERS 167,
171-173 (1920).
42. See text following note 37, supra.
43. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943).
44. I am far from suggesting that these clauses do not serve their pur-
pose. But they are not often challenged in appellate litigation, and they
therefore take their form less from rules developed in the case law than
from requirements of mass-produced litigation in trial courts (e.g., debt
collection).
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in several ways. First, they might say that it is untrue, that the
Behaviorist findings only apply to certain sorts of transactions, that
important cases are indeed litigated, and that businessmen in fact
do use certain rules derived from case law in planning their rela-
tionships. But anyone who has begun to argue this way has himself
become a Behavioral Realist, since this kind of assertion assumes
the relevance of a universe of experience outside the case law.
Second, they might admit everything, but say the cases are val-
uable tools for training lawyers. But most lawyers who have any-
thing to do with contracts will not be litigating them or planning
in anticipation of litigation; moreover, if it is conceded that the
cases represent freak situations, the study of their facts will not
yield much relevant vicarious experience. It may be said that the
cases are always good for teaching analytic method, but this is
obviously not a serious response. It explains the casebooks but not
the treatises and articles.
A third and more interesting response is one that concedes a
large part of the Behaviorist case but maintains that Contract is
undergoing a resurrection. The clearest sign that the common law
has not lost its genius for change and adaptation is the new body
of case law promoting procedural standards of fair dealing be-
tween unequals and protecting underdogs (notably consumer buy-
ers) against overreaching sellers. 45 A Behaviorist would have to
reply that this is where the case law of contract has shown itself
to be most ineffectual. The underdogs, if poor consumers, are not
inclined to litigate. Those who are so inclined must find free
counsel with time to pursue claims to appeal. The delay and ex-
pense of litigation is often exacerbated by opposing counsel's tac-
tics of abuse of discovery process and delay. Trial courts are
often hostile. When, years later, a favorable judgment has been
wrung out of the appellate court, it has served one client. If the
seller pays any attention to the holding at all it is to draft around
it. 4"
Still another response is to concede that the courts have lost
most of their power to support or regulate important market deal-
ings, but to maintain that they could attract businessmen back
to reliance on their rules as planning guides by crafting better
rules. The hope here is to achieve a new synthesis of contract law
founded on the realities of business practice.47 Several comments
45. The two cases most often cited in this connection are Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) and Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
46. See D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE, ch. 12 (2d ed. 1967); Schrag,
Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer Test Litigation, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV.
115 (1969); Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the
Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PnT. L. Rav. 349 (1970).
47. This is the program of Professor Speidel, supra note 31, at 828.
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might be made on this program. First, such a synthesis could not,
assuming the validity of the Friedman-Macaulay view, be built
out of existing case law materials. The cases are unpromising ma-
terial for the extraction of general rules-even rules for how to mop
up transactions gone sour and litigated-because of the atypicality
of their facts, the particularized methods used to decide them, and
above all the marginal relationship of the parties to the economic
system.
Suppose, however, that Case Lawyers were willing to go outside
the case law to study business practices for the purpose of develop-
ing a literature to educate judges in how to decide cases. It would
presumably not be worth doing if the courts continued to decide
the same kinds of cases they do now.48  Yet the program of at-
tracting important businesses back to the courts as litigants as-
sumes that they stay away only because results are unpredictable,
or made in ignorance of their business needs. The much more
plausible explanations for their staying away are the expense and
delays of litigation and the existence of effective private sanctions.
Finally, one may well question the prospects for success of a pro-
gram whose chief targets rarely possess the time to read long
briefs or the intellectual power and flexibility of a Learned Hand
or Roger Traynor.
Finally one must confront the conviction of at least some Case
Lawyers that the process of contract case law adjudication is worth
the closest attention because it is a microcosm of fundamental so-
cial principles. In this view appellate courts are given the heroic
role of expressing the inarticulate purposes of the community,
and, by tiny stages, developing the norms that will harmonize the
combat of social purposes to the end of the greatest good.
Oddly enough it is to this most ambitious of Case Lawyers' claims
that Behaviorists concede a limited degree of validity. The conces-
sion is limited because the Behaviorists point out that so much is
excluded from the field of vision of the general case law of con-
tract: conflict between important interest groups (regulated by
specialized statutory and administrative law), disputes between
parties to continuing relationships (usually settled by private sanc-
tions), and so on. Contract litigation, left with such tag-ends of
problems nobody cares enough to regulate in some other way, is
perhaps therefore not the place to look for clues to settling conflicts
about which people care deeply.49 Nevertheless, at a very general
48. Macaulay, supra note 35, at 1118-1120 is a careful discussion of this
point. He concludes that as a general matter, given the enormous investi-
gative effort required to give an adequate empirical basis to a sound rule
of general policy, it is probably more efficient for courts to particularize
their decisions to the parties, circumstances, and transaction immediately
before them. He concedes the relevancy of criteria other than efficiency.
49. Professor Clyde Summers reaches the same conclusion by a slightly
different route. After demonstrating that rules of contract law are useless
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level contract law may contain some principles and characteristic
methods of operation dealing with "interpretation, fairness, and
appropriateness of remedy" that at least "provide a starting place
for analysis" in the effort to design rules and processes for the
regulation of important aspects of commercial life.50 Still, while
this concession suggests a means partially to recoup the enormous
investment of intellectual resources in the study of contract law, it
does not contribute to the argument for continuing the investment.
Professor Gilmore has not chosen to meet the challenge of the
Behaviorists with any of these five responses, or with any other
argument that genuinely comes to terms with the Behavioral the-
sis. He asserts simply that his kind of historical study is a more
interesting (and, implicitly, more valuable) enterprise than theirs.
It will be useful, then, to consider to what extent The Death of
Contract validates this claim.
III.
I mentioned earlier 5 ' a Behaviorist counterpart to Gilmore's his-
torical account of the "death of contract"-Friedman's "decline of
the court". (It is, of course, entirely in character that Gilmore
should tell a story of doctrinal, Friedman of institutional, deteri-
oration.) Friedman attributes this decline to the displacement of
case law by Progressive regulatory legislation and the growing dis-
inclination of businessmen to bring their disputes to court be-
cause: (a) business was increasingly conducted in long-term con-
tinuing relationships; (b) judges' insight into business affairs de-
clined as these became more complex and specialized; and (c) costs
and delays of court action increased. 52
or harmful when applied to problems arising out of special sorts of contracts
(collective agreements), he says:
The law of contracts as presently conceived . . . cannot be expected
to provide framework for integrating the rules and principles appli-
cable to contractual transactions. Its generalizations are built largely
upon selected cases considered to be "contract" cases by legal schol-
ars, restatement writers, annotators, and indexers. This tends to ex-
clude cases involving "special" transactions which can be treated
more easily under other headings. The legal rules thus developed are
not rules of general applicability; they are at the most general rules
adequate for regulating those transactions not adequate enough or nu-
merous enough to have stimulated the development of separate bodies
of rules.
Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J.
525, 566-567 (1969).
50. S. MACAULAY, supra note 38, at 199. See to the same effect, Summers,
supra note 49, at 567-575 (recasting contract law as the "comparative law
of commercial transactions" might reveal some broad principles or prob-
lems that cut across the various "families" of commercial transactions-col-
lective agreements, leases, partnership agreements, insurance, etc.); Mac-
Neil, supra note 22, at 807-813 (there exist identifiable general contractual
norms or principles growing out of the "primal roots" of contract).
51. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
52. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, 198-202. The proposition that as indus-
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Viewed in this spacious perspective, the collapse of order and
system in contract case law is the result simply of that law's in-
creasing insignificance:
[T]he judges were abandoning their habit of abstraction
. . . . The character of their cases gave them liberty to par-
ticularize. The scope of their cases was narrow. They de-
cided small personal disputes-like the support contract
cases-and cases arising out of marginal business trans-
actions . . . . After all, insofar as the cases were trivial,
... the judges bore no crushing responsibility to. serve
values of wide scope, and could safely pay heed to the par-
ticular merits of situations before them.58
Moreover, this decline in the court's role and consequent partic-
ularizing habit was well advanced by 1905, that is, 15 years before
the publication of Williston on Contracts.
Friedman shows how Wisconsin courts, however tough and ab-
stract the language they sometimes talked, in fact to an extraordi-
nary degree individualized their decisions by making liberal use of
excuses like fraud, mistake and duress, by freely implying war-
ranties for the benefit of buyers, and by frequently affecting "ob-
jective" interpretation and construction of written instruments
only to find, in the end, that other facts in the case suggested what
the parties had actually intended.54 If Friedman is right about
this, then not Corbin and Cardozo but very ordinary judges killed
off "Contract" in the sense of a formal, consistently applied body
of general rules (to the debatable extent that such a thing ever ex-
isted). All Corbin, Cardozo and the Realists did was to point out to
the courts that this is what they had been doing.
Gilmore's deathbed scenes seem therefore to occupy only an odd
corner of the legal history of contract. They make up a curious
episode in the history of the relations between judicial style and
academic doctrine. The construct put together by Langdell, Holmes
and Williston, though it suited the formalistic style of the 1880's
and 90's, was substantively obsolete before they had finished build-
ing it. The Realists helped to expose the conflict between style
and substance and to promote in some judges (though by no
means all or perhaps even most) a rhetoric and method more
suited to the actualities of contract cases-fact-centered, policy-or-
iented, and concerned with reasonableness, fairness and good faith.
One could wish, consequently, that Gilmore had located 'his story
within the framework of the history of business activity and legal
trialization proceeds, commercial litigation first rises somewhat, then
sharply declines, is well on its way to being established as a regular pat-
tern in at least Western societies. See the careful statistical demonstration
(for Spain) of J. Toharia Cortes, Cambio Social y Vida Juridica en 'Espafia,
1900-1970 (unpublished dissertation Univ. Complutense of Madrid, 1971).
53. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 213.
54. Id. at 97-98, 101-107.
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institutions. But his not doing so does not make his subject trivial.
On the contrary, it is amazingly interesting because we are still
living in the circling ripples of the classical theory of contract, still
using its conceptual apparatus in our courts, still teaching our first-
year students how to take it apart. If it has not significantly af-
fected what lawyers do, it has had an enormous impact on how
they talk about what they do. But why? Why did classical the-
ory take the form it did? Why did the courts take over its jargon
and concepts? Why is it still around? What bothers me most
about Gilmore's book is that he only hints at some possible answers.
Some of the hints are promising and some not, but in neither case
does he ever elaborate, and his failure to do so means his book is
conspicuously lacking in conclusions. This happens, I am per-
suaded, because the answers lie outside the field of vision of the
Case-Law Realist tradition out of which he writes. Not, mind you,
that I know the answers. But I would like to suggest some places
we might look for them.
A. Architects of the Classical Theory
The first puzzle to confront the reader of The Death of Contract
is the attribution of the theory to the firm of Langdell, Holmes &
Williston, an unlikely trio of partners. Langdell and Williston both
built systems of logical, internally consistent doctrine. Holmes was
impatient with system-building. He said of Langdell's Casebook
and Summary that he had never read "a more misspent piece of
marvellous ingenuity" and that Langdell "represents the powers of
darkness. He is all for logic and hates any reference to anything
outside of it . . . . 5 The Realists were to claim Holmes as inspi-
ration and authority for their attacks on treatises like Williston's.
Yet Williston was able to draw on Holmes' insights to further
Langdellian ambitions for elegantia Juris, and some of those in-
sights lent themselves readily to that use of them.
Holmes' treatment of contract in The Common Law, especially
in comparison to his treatment of tort, is especially unsystematic.
He is not building a theory of contract but only using some as-
pects of contract law to illustrate points of a thesis argued at
greater length in other lectures. Many of these illustrations would
have been of little interest to Williston (e.g., Holmes' refutation
of the notion that "consideration" came from Roman causa via
Chancery practice), but he clearly absorbed Holmes' insistence that
the law was moving toward concern with objective, external con-
duct and away from subjective states of mind. 6 As Gilmore says,
this has a tendency to simplify factual inquiry: if you are not
55. 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS (M. Howe ed. 1941) [letter of April
10, 1881]; and see M. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE PROVING
YEARS 155-159 (1963) for further comments of Holmes on Langdell.
56. See GILMORE 43 and the illustrations from Williston there cited.
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concerned with what the parties really wanted, you can limit
scrutiny of their behavior to certain external forms, and "in time
[the factual inquiry] can be dispensed with'altogether as the courts
accumulate precedents about recurring types of permissible and im-
permissible 'conduct'. By this process questions, originally per-
ceived as questions of fact, will resolve themselves into questions
of law. ' 57 Surely Williston would probably have been just as happy
with "subjective" theory, so long as it came with rules of evidence
excluding as unreliable all but certain manifestations of intent. The
virtue of the objective theory was that it lent itself beautifully to
the abstraction that makes possible doctrinal coherence.
B. Content and Purposes of the Theory
Gilmore was earlier quoted as saying that the Holmes-Williston
theory of contract was one of liability made absolute, but se-
verely restricted both in scope and extent.58 Why? At one point
Gilmore vaguely speculates that "the Puritan ethic was somehow
involved" in the idea of absolute liability; 59 at another he suggests
that the theory responded to the same "felt needs" that produced
19th century liberal political economy, and that both "implicitly
assumed" a "narrow scope of social duty."6 0 This rings true in
some ways. Holmes and Williston were 19th century individual-
ists, skeptical about the ability of governmental regulation to pro-
duce social improvement.6 1 Yet both tolerated and acknowledged
the inevitability of such regulation to a significantly greater degree
than other wellplaced lawyers of the early 20th century; neither
was a doctrinaire believer in "liberty of contract. ' 62  Moreover,
Holmes thought that the law set objective standards for liability
(independent of subjective intent or any degree of moral blamewor-
thiness) precisely in order to make social regulation possible:
"When men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacri-
fice of individual peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is nec-
essary to the general welfare. '63 This view is of course not at odds
57. Id. at 42.
58. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
59. GILMORE 47. It is hard to guess what "Puritan ethic" in this context
means. Perhaps Gilmore is thinking of an undiluted Calvinism in which
neither good intentions nor good works can make the slightest difference
to a sinner's prospects for election or damnation.
60. Id. at 95-96.
61. Holmes' disdain for progressive social movements is too well known
to require documentation. As for Williston, see his autobiography, S. WIL-
LISTON, LIFE AND LAw 335 (1953): "One who has believed in the theories
of Emerson and Franklin cannot fail to be troubled by confirmed deficit
spending and centralized bureaucratic, paternalistic regimentation."
62. See Holmes' famous dissents in the "economic due process" cases and
Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CoRNELL L.Q. 365 (1921).
63. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 86. Though Holmes says that individ-
ualism in the sense of giving wide scope to the assertion of individual pe-
culiarities must be sacrificed to the general welfare, the basic thrust of his
1232 [VOL. 1974:1216
HeinOnline -- 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 1232 1974
NUMBERA 4 BOOK REVIEW 1233
with one aspect of liberal political economy in practice: its Dar-
winian callousness towards a party who has made a bad bargain
in the marketplace and now seeks to be excused on the grounds of
fraud, mistake, duress and the like. But I believe that on the
whole the notion of an absolute contract liability (which, Gilmore
points out, was not invented by Holmes but had been floating
around American common law since 182764) is not an end result
that Holmes' theory aims at, but merely a by-product of the cen-
tral thesis that contract law is formal and external.
Gilmore's point, however, that the objective theory sought to
transform questions of fact into questions of law is very well
taken. But again, what was the purpose of this? I have mentioned
its utility for Williston's impulses towards construction of doctrinal
cathedrals insulated against the penetration of social fact. Gilmore
believes avoidance of fact questions is linked to a distrust of the
civil jury and a desire to bring as many questions as possible
within the scope of appellate review.65 For reasons spelled out be-
low,66 I agree with him. But surely the main purpose both Holmes
and Williston hoped the objective theory would serve was to in-
crease certainty in the application of legal rules.67 In planning
their affairs private parties could guess more accurately at the re-
sults of litigation if standards for their conduct were no longer left
to juries but were synthesized into rules announced in case law from
the many jury verdicts on standardized sets of facts.6 6 Holmes de-
veloped this idea in the context of negligence.
Unlike Gilmore, who does not tell us in this book (though he
may in his next6 9 ), I do not know how Holmes as a judge sought
to promote predictability in contract litigation, but it is safe to say
that if this was Holmes' and Williston's chief aim, it was also their
argument is libertarian in another sense. As social life forces us into greater
interdependence, the more we shall need regulation; but the more regula-
tion we have the more important is it that it be cast in forms that make
it predictable. The free man is the man who can make choices knowing
what consequences the state will make follow from his acts.
64. GILMORE 44-45, 125 n.103.
65. Id. at 99.
66. See text following note 84 infra.
67. M. HowE, supra note 55, at 198-200; S. WLLisToN, supra note 61, at
209:
Langdell's followers have recognized the necessity that rules of law
should produce satisfactory economic and social effects, and that
there must be a variety of rules to govern the affairs of men; but
there is a difference in emphasis. This group has attached greater
value to the simplicity and certainty that can best be attained by a
limited number of recognized principles carried logically to their con-
clusion than their critics seem to have done.
See also note 63 supra.
68. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 98.
69. Gilmore is completing the biography of Holmes begun by the late
Mark deWolfe Howe, whose narrative had reached the point of Holmes'
appointment to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
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chief delusion. Their rules met the convenience of the treatise
writers but not of the businessmen whose security of expectations
they were designed to promote. Some of the rules seemed pur-
posely designed to promote uncertainty--such as the doctrine that
even offers reciting their irrevocability on their face could be re-
voked before acceptance. Other rules, such as those dealing with
mutuality and illusory promises, refused enforceability to com-
mon kinds of business deals like the long-term requirements con-
tract. The main problem, however, went deeper. Businessmen
will not find the rules of courts useful in planning their conduct
unless they make a practice of use or threatened use of courts, and
the less they use the courts the less will the rules conform to busi-
ness expectations. In contrast to Holmes' negligence cases, there
will be nothing out of which to synthesize objective standards of
conduct. Lacking the data (and doubtless also the temperament)
to derive rules from regularities of business practice as revealed
in litigated cases, Williston was constrained to deduce them from
other rules.
C. The Theory's Acceptance in the Courts
Gilmore wonders why Langdell's idea of a general theory of con-
tract "had the fabulous success it did instead of going down the
drain into oblivion as a hundred better ideas than Langdell's do
every week.170 Its "success" in the courts was of a peculiar kind.
Judges borrowed the terminology and categories of the theory
but not its results. They appropriated the "bargain" theory of con-
sideration but in fact enforced unbargained-for reliance.
Nonetheless, one may well ask how it came about that a scheme
smelling so strongly of the lamp, as the Holmes-Williston theory,
had such an appeal for common law judges. Gilmore thinks it
helped satisfy a hunger for some national uniformity of commer-
cial law.71 I guess I would just want more evidence on this point.
National uniformity is the sort of rallying cry that rouses the
august members of the American Law Institute, but how did the
local commercial bench and bar feel about it? Friedman's hypothe-
sis is that the bench and bar welcomed the technical, erudite, sci-
entific look of the new treatises as did the schools, and for the
same reasons. The idea that law was very difficult and required
formal training was useful in the early years of the cooperative ef-
forts of law schools and bar associations to erect barriers of
educational requirements and bar examinations so as to raise the
standards of practice and to keep out the riffraff.
72
70. GILMOR. 14.
71. Id. at 96-97.
72. L. FiEDmAN, A HISTORY OF AMEmCAN LAW 536 (1973). See also
Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: --The American Law School, 5 PERsPECTlvES
iN AM. HISTORY 403, 453-64 (1971).
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Williston's treatise and the Restatements also suited the formal
style of judicial decisionmaking (though that style was on its way
out when the Restatement of Contracts appeared in 1932) by sup-
plying formal structure on a scale never before dreamed of. But
what was the impulse that produced the need and the means to
fill it?
In the early 19th century judges had thrust upon them a large
discretionary role in adminstering the society and economy of the
American states. This role was new to American judges, seemed
incongruous in a democracy, and had to be legitimated.7 3 Origin-
ally, this was accomplished by explaining in their decisions how
they helped to promote important social purposes, notably economic
growth. 74  But in the late 19th century they sought legitimacy
through formalism. Perhaps this was to justify their kamikaze
exercises of power in invalidating progressive welfare legislation
and enjoining unions. Professor William Nelson has recently sug-
gested another explanation. He says formalistic reasoning arose in
the 1880's after pre-Civil War legal "instrumentalism" had become
disgraced through being associated with proslavery decisions. In
particular the Supreme Court of the United States took generations
to recover from the taint of Scott v. Sandford.75 Nelson says that
formalism was not only a technique for separating law from poli-
tics but was also the style of a revival of a natural law jurispru-
dence of "principle" rather than of "expediency" founded on the
moral absolutism of the anti-slavery movement.78  A tendency to
believe that legal rules could be drawn deductively from self-evi-
dent moral principles was happily reinforced by the quest for the
scientific ideal in law by academics like Langdell. 77 Friedman adds
the suggestion that formalism of style and the embrace of the op-
portunity offered by Langdell and Williston to turn it into super-
formalism may also have been a way for the judges to obtain the
compensations of prestige for the decline in their power-relegated
73. For a recent theoretical analysis of the relationship of legal formality
to the legitimacy of court decisions, see Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LF-
GAL STUDIES 351 (1973), a dazzling article that in its statement of the prob-
lem alone illuminates whole areas of law.
74. See Horwitz, The Emergence of An Instrumental Conception of Law,
5 PERSPECTIVES iN AM. HISToRY 287 (1971).
75. 61 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
76. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Ju-
dicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARv. L. REV. 513, 549-
51 (1974). Nelson's thesis calls to mind the attacks made on the Legal
Realists, accusing them of amoral positivism, in the light of the Nazi rise
to power in Germany. There is considerable irony in the fact that whatever
the Realists owed to Holmes was also formed in the Civil War, which killed
off antislavery idealism in Holmes the soldier and bred in him the profound
skepticism about absolute moral claims that forms the emotional basis for
his jurisprudence.
77. Id. at 562-63.
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to a marginal societal role in contract disputes, they took on the
mantles of oracles.
7 8
Yet with all these interesting things going on around him, Gil-
more chooses to focus on the least distinctive aspect of 20th cen-
tury contract law: the decay in integrity of a doctrinal system. 79
Doctrinal disintegration is not a very remarkable phenomenon
studied for its own sake, rather than to understand the social and
intellectual forces that produce it. The courts are always groping
for generalizing formulae, the formulae always breaking down, and
the courts finding reformulations. Contract law is unusually
susceptible to doctrinal instability because of the diversity of
incompatible purposes it has been made to serve and the rapid
underlying changes in patterns of doing business. Since the
beginning of the 19th century courts and commentators have talked
about the need to establish commercial rules that will promote se-
curity of business expectations, have announced tough new rules,
and have spent the next two generations riddling them with quali-
fications and exceptions.8 0 Gilmore, out of his vast knowledge
of 19th century commercial law, realizes this better than anyone,
and indeed he gives several examples of mid-19th century break-
down of doctrine in this book.8'
What, then, was so special about the construction and collapse
of classical theory in the 20th century? What was special was
the self-consciousness of the processes of creation and destruction.
The common law never saw anything in its history like the huge
systematizing treatises of the early 20th century, and the people
who tore them apart produced a remarkable legal literature.
Judges left to themselves weave unconscious of the pattern.
In this century a brand new profession of spectators-law
teachers and law review editors-watched and criticized their ev-
ery move. Furthermore, questions about the wisdom of this hold-
ing or that rapidly turned into questions about what was worth
studying in law, which in turn became impossible to disentangle
from questions about what was important to teach law students;
debates over doctrine were magnified (or reduced) to quarrels over
curriculum. The rise and fall of academic doctrinal systems must
78. L. FREMAN, supra note 23, at 213-14.
79. Gilmore does not even elaborate on an interesting earlier thesis of
his that 19th century "conceptualism" broke down because of the sheer vol-
ume of reports-there were too many cases for the judges to ensure the in-
tegrity of conceptual systems. He ascribes the growth of legal realism as
an intellectual movement to this process as well, though it is never made
entirely clear (at least to me) what the connection is. Gilmore, Legal
Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961).
80. See Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87
HARv. L. REV. 917 (1974).
81. GiLMORE 77-81. G. GILMORE, SEcur= INrTEREsTs mN PERSONAL PRop-
vRTY (1965) is crammed with instances from 19th century doctrine on chat-
tel mortgages.
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therefore have some, probably close, connection with changes tak-
ing place in legal education.8 2 Gilmore does not on this occasion
explore such a connection. Whoever does might find in it some
hints toward the solution of one of the problems posed at the
beginning of this section: Why is the classical theory still
around.
D. The Survival of Contract
As Gilmore himself implies, there probably should never 'have
been a general theory of contract at all. Contract was fused out
of old specialties like bailments, suretyship, and sales. But by the
time Williston published his treatise, it was in the process of break-
ing up again in the decisions of courts as patterns of practice in
different contexts informed judicial decision making: offer and
acceptance law became real estate brokers' law, subcontractors' bid
law, insurance policy law, catalogue sales law, and so forth. The
only unity remaining in contract law was that of the classical the-
ory. If Contracts was to continue to be maintained as a course of
instruction, as an organizing category, the classical theory had to
be maintained, if only as the target for Realist attacks. Case-Law
Realism as a method of exposition and teaching defined itself, di-
alectically as it were, as a challenge and alternative to classical
contract and as a method of finding better answers to the same
questions. The Realists were like 18th century rationalist skeptics
obsessed with criticism of a sacred text. Meanwhile the case
method had proved a remarkable pedagogical success as a vehicle
for imparting analytic skills.
Yet the continued occupation of the center of legal study by case
law remains something of a mystery. One could understand it if
being a lawyer in America were like being an English barrister, a
trial lawyer whose mastery of a manageable body of legal doc-
trine is an indispensable skill for the work involved. But it isn't.
The two hypotheses suggested above to explain the survival of
Contract case law through the compromise of Case-Law Realism
(the need for constant reenactment of the oedipal destruction of the
classical theory and the pedagogic virtues of teaching by the
case method) do not seem explanation enough for the extraordi-
nary continuity of the case-law tradition through 103 years of legal
education.
Here are some clues. Langdell thought only cases (preferably
English cases, which accounted for over 90 per cent of those in his
casebook) were the proper materials for legal "science" at a time
82. In fact the fullest account to date of the Legal Realist movement, W.
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973), treats Real-
ism almost exclusively as an event in the history of legal education (rather
than of jurisprudence or social theory of commercial law), with results that
are in many ways rewarding.
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when he was trying to impart some academic hauteur to legal
training. Holmes asked himself:
How can the laborious study of a dry and technical sys-
tem, the greedy watch for clients and the practice of shop-
keepers' arts, the mannerless conflicts over often sordid
interests, make out a life?
83
He answered by saying that law schools must strive to turn out,
and lawyers to be, thinkers in their craft. Langdell rather
snobbishly evokes a world of English barristers in their wigs
and clubs, Holmes a striving for connection to the great world
of cosmopolitan learning. But they have in common a fastidious-
ness about ordinary law practice and a vision of the ideal of the
scholar-scientist-practitioner.
In a time when even some of the leaders of the bar felt their
possession had become a "business" and the business one of clerk-
ing for the corporations, the vision had obvious attractions. 84 Ap-
pellate judging and practice are the least grubby of legal jobs-the
most intellectual, the most dependent upon reason. Counsel speak
in moderate tones in a quiet room, the judges reason with one an-
other, they explain their decision, it becomes immediately binding
on the parties who (usually) comply with it. It is no wonder that
law teachers should wish that this tranquil and rational way of do-
ing things represented the norm of a lawyer's work, and if not the
usual, at least the ultimate, means of resolving social disputes.
This may help to explain the classical theory's drive to reformu-
late questions of fact as questions of law and in so doing to ex-
pand the scope of appellate review. This is the arena where the
scholar is most likely to be the successful practitioner. ("Which of
us," Goethe somewhere remarks, "is so civilized as to refrain from
cruelly stressing, at times, the qualities in which he excels?")
Case law is among other things the ideology of mandarins.
Gilmore sees coming a time when criticism of case law doctrine
will be displaced from the center of law study. I hope he is
right, but he is gloomy about it. Here and there in his book he
throws out garlands of superlatives: 85 Corbin on Contracts is "the
greatest law book ever written"; the Restatement of Contracts
is "one of the great legal accomplishments of all time"; the Restate-
ment and the U.C.C. are "our two most notable twentieth century
legal artifacts"; the "reduction of the basic fields of law to self-
contained and logically consistent systems of rule and doctrine [is]
the greatest achievement" of late 19th and early 20th century jur-
83. O.W. HOLMES, The Profession of the Law, in CoLLF crED LEGAL PAPERS
29 (1920).
84. See R. HOFSTADER, THE AGE OF REFORM 156-163 (1955).
85. I am indebted to my colleague Marc Galanter for pointing this out
to me.
1238 [VOL., 1974:1216
HeinOnline -- 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 1238 1974
BooK REvIEw
isprudence.86 The tone is elegiac-he seems to be saying: "Many
ingenious lovely things are gone. 8 7 He sees moving across the dis-
tant plain armies of sweating sociologists, clipboards and calipers
in hand, to bivouac in plastic tents where pyramids once stood.
And in fact we shall do well to worry if the new orthodoxies
threaten to constrict our view of the world as narrowly as
did the old ones they are replacing.
ROBERT W. GoRwiONt
86. GILMORE 57, 59, 82, 101-102.
87. W. YEATS, Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen, in CoLLECTM POEMS 232
(1934).
t Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
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